Materialism or Dualism

[IanKennedy]

Exactly. The fact that the two diverged subsequently to the split isn't material to the question; but at the exact time of divergence, which one was the "real" one? And further, if only one survived the transporter problem, would it matter which one was?

The same bag of grey matter in the exact same state, even down to the quantum level, makes them the same. Given the number of times we've seen the transporter work and not change the person that uses it I think that's a given. So, who's real, both are. You've effectively got an instant person cloning device, stressing the word person and not just body.

[Teaos]

Exactly, if it has copied me exactly down to the quantum level, then both bags of meat for the split second after the second is made, are identical, both would act the same way if presented with the same situation. From that point on they change given different experiences.

Its just like my laptop, there are probably tens of thousands of the same laptop in the world, but mine is the only one with the information and programmes I have put on it, but it would be possible to create another one that is exactly the same, meaning that for all intents and purposes there are two of my laptops (barring ownership)

[Mikey]

This illustrates my point. If both "people" are the same person at the instant of transport/duplication, then if the original is destroyed upon the creation of the copy then the copy is the person. Therefore, the continuity of the physically contiguous matter is unimportant to the identity of the subject, and therefore a materialist point of view is untenable.

This:

From that point on they change given different experiences.

is immaterial, as the original would change in the same way if there were no transportation/duplication.

[Teaos]

I think your misunderstanding us when we say "the meat in your head" its not the actual physical meat, the atoms and cells dont matter. Its the way it is put together. A copy is the same as the original because the way the meat is layed out is the same. The physical meat is irrelivant, its blueprint is what matters, a physical and scientific lay out of its cells.

[IanKennedy]

This illustrates my point. If both "people" are the same person at the instant of transport/duplication, then if the original is destroyed upon the creation of the copy then the copy is the person. Therefore, the continuity of the physically contiguous matter is unimportant to the identity of the subject, and therefore a materialist point of view is untenable.

I'm not sure that is a thing that can be said. The material in each case (or body) is exactly the same in both case. The exact physical atoms may be different but the whole state of them in every quantifiable way is the same. If you where be asked to differentiate between them there would be no way to tell them apart.

Current theories about transporters state that the duplicates would suffer from, or benefit from to look at it another way, quantum entanglement. This results in any change to one copy being reproduced in the other copy. Current experiments have pretty much verified that at the single particle level but I can't see how that would work on a macroscopic scale. If it held true on that scale then it would be impossible for the copies to diverge from each other, as each would experience the results of the experiences of the other. More likely, the quantum entanglement would simply break down and the duplicates would go their separate ways.

What you argument comes down to is when is matter different from an exact duplicate of it's self. You are trying to say that the state called the 'person' exists outside of the matter because you can transfer it to another set of matter. The problem with that is nature of the matter you are copying it to, being a complete and utter duplicate of the original in every way it is somewhat different from copying a piece of software from one computer to an identically spec'd machine.

[Mikey]

I understand what materialism means in this case; what I'm saying is that, quantum entanglement can't be viewed as a new wrinkle in the question, but must be viewed as part of the question. Any other aspects of the duplication process likewise do not invalidate the question but are part of it. The bottom line in my stance is that if personal identity can be maintained without physical numerical identity, materialism doesn't hold. My epistemological instinct is that the viewpoint that "Materialism holds, requiring physical continuity except if..." is an untenable viewpoint.

[IanKennedy]

I understand what materialism means in this case; what I'm saying is that, quantum entanglement can't be viewed as a new wrinkle in the question, but must be viewed as part of the question. Any other aspects of the duplication process likewise do not invalidate the question but are part of it. The bottom line in my stance is that if personal identity can be maintained without physical numerical identity, materialism doesn't hold. My epistemological instinct is that the viewpoint that "Materialism holds, requiring physical continuity except if..." is an untenable viewpoint.

Instinct and quantum are generally not things that work together.

[Graham Kennedy]

Is it possible to have two exact duplicate brains when they are in two different places? I mean, the fact that they are in two different places means there is at least one thing different about every atom in every brain - their location is different.

[Teaos]

Does position matter? Assumeing the laws of physics are the same everywhere I dont see why it would matter.

[Mikey]

I understand what materialism means in this case; what I'm saying is that, quantum entanglement can't be viewed as a new wrinkle in the question, but must be viewed as part of the question. Any other aspects of the duplication process likewise do not invalidate the question but are part of it. The bottom line in my stance is that if personal identity can be maintained without physical numerical identity, materialism doesn't hold. My epistemological instinct is that the viewpoint that "Materialism holds, requiring physical continuity except if..." is an untenable viewpoint.

Instinct and quantum are generally not things that work together.

The comment including "instinct" was in reference to the validity (or lack thereof) of a viewpoint that requires exceptions to still be held, not to the idea of quantum entanglement ar any other situational modifiers inside the thought experiment.

Does position matter? Assumeing the laws of physics are the same everywhere I dont see why it would matter.

Well, you know, chaos theory and butterfly effect and all that. However, any changes to either consciousness beyond the instant of duplication are immaterial to the discussion.

[IanKennedy]

Is it possible to have two exact duplicate brains when they are in two different places? I mean, the fact that they are in two different places means there is at least one thing different about every atom in every brain - their location is different.

Within plank time of the duplication there's nothing that can have happened to make a difference.

[IanKennedy]

The comment including "instinct" was in reference to the validity (or lack thereof) of a viewpoint that requires exceptions to still be held, not to the idea of quantum entanglement ar any other situational modifiers inside the thought experiment.

I'm aware of that. However, I'm saying that the nature of quantum effects being involved makes any instinct about the situation less than helpful.

Well, you know, chaos theory and butterfly effect and all that. However, any changes to either consciousness beyond the instant of duplication are immaterial to the discussion.

Within plank time of the duplication nothing can make a difference. After that as Teaos has said changes and diversions could be possible, depending upon if the quantum entanglement holds or not.

If you accept a perfect duplication, even for a plank time length then I can't see a problem with them being the same brain, much as the existing experiment of the 'transport' of the sub-atomic particle produced a duplicate. If the duplicate isn't good enough then they're not the same person and you have instead have a personality duplicator.

[Graham Kennedy]

Does position matter? Assumeing the laws of physics are the same everywhere I dont see why it would matter.

I don't know. But "they are identical in every way" is a different statement than "they are identical in every way that matters", isn't it?

[Teaos]

"Every way that would effect them" Then.

[Mikey]

I'm aware of that. However, I'm saying that the nature of quantum effects being involved makes any instinct about the situation less than helpful.

*sigh* I agree, and it's therefore a good thing that I never said anything like that. The "instinct in comment was strictly and expressly addressed toward epistemological views, not to any situation within the thought experiment.

If you accept a perfect duplication, even for a plank time length then I can't see a problem with them being the same brain, much as the existing experiment of the 'transport' of the sub-atomic particle produced a duplicate. If the duplicate isn't good enough then they're not the same person and you have instead have a personality duplicator.

OK, so we have "same" person but two different "meat" brains. Obviously, the existence of both nullifies any idea of numerical/physical identity, so such cannot be a determinant of true personal identity. Ergo, the idea of personal identity being bound up with physical/numerical identity falls down.